Trader’s Narrative

Last week I suggested that market breadth doesn’t matter, until it does. By which I meant that inspecting every twitch of the cumulative breadth measure for the market isn’t all that useful.

Most of the time, this indicator is brought up because there is a “negative divergence” which then is used to argue that the market is floating on air and will come crashing (or correcting) down because not enough constituents are supporting its rise.

As I mentioned, the problem with this logic is that for the most part, the Nasdaq cumulative breadth has been in perpetual free fall:

The only time this indicator was able to mount a feeble come back was in 2003. And even then, it didn’t last long. While the market continued to rise, the cumulative breadth soon fell and broke through the low set in early 2003.

To see the recent graph of Nasdaq cumulative breadth, check out the link above.

The long term chart of the NYSE cumulative breadth is even more enigmatic. From 1995 to 1998 it rose along with the S&P 500. Then it decoupled and became it’s mirror opposite until the bear market bottom in 2003. And since then it has again, walked in agreement with the market index.

To anyone who proposes the theory of “negative/positive divergence”, I would ask, when should I have bought or sold? and why?

For example, should I have sold in the spring of 1998? and missed the massive run up to 2000? should I have bought in early 2000 because cumulative breadth was turning up and breaking the downtrend? wouldn’t that have resulted in massive losses?

Cumulative breadth simply doesn’t provide any sort of actionable insight. Unless I’m missing something huge. In which case, someone please forgive my elephantine ignorance and rescue me from myself.

If you know anything about Wall St. you won’t be surprised to learn that the cyclical nature of IPO trends can be studied to gain insight into the stock market.

After all, companies don’t go public as a gesture of charity. They do so because they think that they will gain something by exchanging their shares for your money. A transaction occurs when the two sides agree on the price but disagree on the value of the asset in play.

But there is an inherent asymmetry when it comes to IPOs. Although we have put in place measures to protect the public (through circulars, public disclosures, etc.) the insiders still know much more about their company and its merit as an investment than the general public who are taking the other side of the deal.

So obviously when we have an avalanche of insiders wanting to sell to the public, they aren’t doing so because they want to hand over their hard earned capital out of the goodness of their hearts. You know that valuations are so out of whack that they are about to soon regress to the mean. This is what happened in early 2000 - when you had people taking everything short of their daughter’s lemonade stand public.

The current market environment is very different from then. That is why I’m just not persuaded by the dire predictions of mass market meltdown or financial armageddon. We are actually enduring a severe IPO drought.

To play Devil’s advocate, today’s lack of IPOs may be partially explained by the low interest rate environment. Financially strong companies can turn to the fixed income market to find funding at lower cost of capital than equity markets. But I don’t think that explains it completely.

After the jump there is a great article written by Mark Hulbert for the NY Times which goes into more detail about several research studies which look at the predictive characteristics of the IPO market:

Continue reading ‘Using IPO Trends To Time The Stock Market’

Last summer, on June 2007, to be precise, I wrote that the caution was warranted for energy sector. Let’s take a look to see how I did and what lies ahead for this area of the market.

The energy sector managed to push a little bit higher in July 2007 but it then succumbed to the general market weakness. So since I wrote about my apprehension it didn’t go anywhere really for the next two months:

The strength of this sector was undeniable in 2007. In fact, last year it bucked negative seasonality to deliver one of the best sector returns. Usually, from the beginning of June to the beginning of December energy stumbles. In fact, in the past decade only 3 years have bucked this negative seasonality. On the other hand, once December rolls around, things do tend to rock and roll.

Seasonality
The logic behind the seasonal influence is the seasonal weakness in the commodities themselves. Natural gas and oil are weakest in the summer (May to July) and strongest in winter. So right now we are just about to enter the worst time of the year to be long oil and gas stocks.

On top of that 82% of stocks in the Energy Select SPDR (XLE) are trading above their 100 day moving average. That’s not the maximum but it is high. As well, the bullish percent for the sector is a bit “toppy”, hovering below 80%:

The smart thing to do was buy in January and March 2008 when the bullish percent spiked down to 20% (and less). But you already knew that because you know how to time the market using bullish percent charts, don’t you?

On Wall Street it depends who you listen to. Goldman Sachs is hyper-bullish on oil awaiting $150-200 a barrel oil while Lehman Bros. thinks that prices will fall to $83 a barrel in 2009 and $70 by 2010.

What about Peak Oil?
I don’t buy into “Peak Oil”. We will either discover more oil, better extraction methods for existing reserves or move to alternative energy sources. Take new discoveries for example: Thanks to the Tupi discovery, Brazil will become a major oil player - probably joining OPEC as a result. But that is years in the future, assuming all goes according to plan. Petrobras will have to drill more than 16,000 feet under the seabed, itself under 10,000 feet of water. The reward though is tantalizing: 5-8 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.

Sprott, a young Canadian asset management firm, is going public next week. This might be a market tell. Or it may be nothing.

The reason why I bring it up is not because of Sprott’s size or significance to the market. It is after all tiny, managing only $7 Billion - in the world of asset management that doesn’t even register as a blip on the radar.

Rather, it is that Sprott has been at the forefront of the commodity boom, riding the rise of oil, gas, and even obscure natural resources like molybdenum to earn management fees. The owner and main portfolio manager, Eric Sprott, is an unapologetic believer in “peak oil” and a huge gold bug.

What makes me question the IPO is its potential significance as a market tell for the whole commodity boom. There is no question that Sprott is an astute manager and market timer. The track record of his various funds attests to that. The natural corollary is then, why is he selling now?

If he thought that the commodity boom would be continuing or even accelerating, wouldn’t he want to keep aas much of the company and the profits for himself?

The only logical reason to sell is if the commodity boom is about to come to an end.

Consider these other examples:

Sam Zell, probably the keenest real estate investor today, sold Equity Office Properties in February 2007 to Blackstone after a protracted bidding war between the winner and Vornado REIT. You get one guess on when the REITs in the US topped out.

Or take the June 2007 IPO of Blackstone Group (BX), one of the largest private capital managers in the US. Timing when to take companies public, when to take them private, and valuation is their bread and butter. Do you think they might know something you don’t?

Blackstone’s IPO marked not only its own share price but also the top for private equity deals:

For more examples, check out: Don’t buy what Wall St. sells

Of course that doesn’t mean that by default all IPOs are to be shunned. But in the case of Sprott there is a more fundamental reason. It is extremely expensive! The IPO values Sprott Asset Management at $1.5 Billion - twice as much as other Canadian boutique asset managers. Finally, Sprott is selling right at the top. The TSX is at a triple high above 14,500 and the energy sector is rather stretched to the upside as well.

Given the cyclical nature of the natural resource sector, my hunch is that sooner rather than later this sector will revert to the mean. Peak oil is a meaningless concept that has been bandied about for the past 50 years. Every time oil prices go up it finds a new following and every time oil prices return to earth the peak oilers somehow melt into the scenery quietly. The reason why Hubbert’s theory has been proven wrong again and again is that new advances in science and engineering processes move the line in the sand. In effect making it an anachronism.

In any case, for those interested, watch for Sprott’s IPO on May 15th. It will trade under the symbol SII on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The sentiment landscape has changed much from just a month ago:

Sentiment Surveys
The AAII sentiment survey came in this week at 53% bulls - unchanged from last week. Not only is this a very high bullish reading for this indicator, it is the level at which the market topped out last October. Furthermore, the fact that it has remained firm in the light of this past week’s market performance should be sending chills down the spines of bulls.

From a contrarian point of view, I want to see the retail investors (AAII respondents) become fearful as the market is falling and remain so even as it rises. The fact that they have now quickly shuffled over from extreme bearishness to bullishness and maintained it for two weeks, even as the market fell, reinforces my belief that we are in for some trouble.

In contrast, the Investor’s Intelligence survey is showing 44.4% bears and 32.3% bulls. There was a slight increase in the bullish numbers and an even larger increase in the bearish camp. Still, according to the current II we aren’t anywhere near bullish extremes. Take for example that the bull/bear ratio is 1.37 - it was more than 3.0 when the market topped last October.

Rydex Nova/Ursa Ratio

In case you’re not familiar with this indicator: before the onslaught of ETFs, Rydex’s Ursa and Nova were the ticket if you wanted to time the market. The are mutual funds but they settled twice daily (I don’t think they do anymore) and you could switch assets between them or other Rydex funds with no penalty. Like other contrarian indicators, when the fast money crowds to one side, the smart thing to do is to jump to the other side.

Right now the ratio is showing an abundance of optimism from the Rydex fund timers. Something which makes me wary. On its own this wouldn’t be enough to really concern me but it is just one more in an ever growing list of short term indicators which suggest some sort of correction or pause at best.

Fund Flows
The only bright spot, from a contrarian perspective, in the sentiment overview is the mutual fund money flows. According to AMG Data, one of the largest and most accurate providers of this sort of data: domestic (US) mutual funds reported net redemptions (outflows) of $8.6 Billion. This dovetails with the panicky behavior we’re seeing in Canada.

With interest rates so low, and cash being basically a negative return investment, you won’t be surprised to learn that money market funds had the largest monthly outflow in April ever on record: $78.7 Billion. Some of the cash flowed into municipal bond funds ($4 B), no doubt in search of a higher yield. But I suspect much of it, perhaps even the vast majority, was the US consumer’s retrenchment.

Finally, among the sectors, real estate funds received the largest inflow of money since February 2007 - which was exactly the worst time to buy REITs or anything else real estate related in the stock market.

So while this beleaguered sector has valiantly fought back from the January 2008 lows, it may be about to top out (again). Look alive out there.